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THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN FLORIDA
Rule 1.41 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,1 which was
adopted on July 28, 1965, brings third-party practice into the procedural law of Florida. The acceptance of this rule by the Florida
Supreme Court reflects a continuing trend toward the liberalization of
the modes and means available to the attorney in handling a lawsuit.
Impleader, as this procedural device is often called, allows a defendant to bring in a person, not a party to the suit, who is or may
be liable over to him for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 2 The

purpose of this note is to analyze Rule 1.41 with the hope that the
reader will obtain an understanding of the rule and its use in a lawsuit. Since the Florida rule is patterned after Rule 14 of the Federal
Rules, much has been drawn from the law that has developed in the
federal courts under that rule. The Florida Bar Subcommittee on
Civil Procedure recommended adoption of Rule 1.41 after reveiwing
the federal rule, the federal committee reports, and the operation of
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.41, which becomes effective January 1, 1966, provides:
"(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a third party plaintiff may cause a summons
and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third
party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files the third party
complaint not later than twenty days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The
person served with the summons and third party complaint, hereinafter called
the third party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third party plaintiffs
claim as provided in Rules 1.8 and 1.11 and his counterclaims against the third
party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third party defendants as provided
in Rule 1.13. The third party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any
defenses which the third party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third
party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff and the third party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rules 1.8 and 1.11 and
his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 1.13. Any party may move
to strike the third party claim or for its severance or separate trial. A third party
defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action
against the third party defendant.
" (b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a counterclaim is asserted against the plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so."
2. Rule 1.41 is identical with Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
except that the defendant has twenty days to file the third-party complaint before
leave must be obtained, whereas Rule 14 provides for a ten-day period.
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the rule as discussed in Moore's Manual3 and Federal Practice and
Procedureby Barron and Holtzoff. 4 It can be expected, therefore, that
the Florida courts also will look to the operation of the federal rule for
guidance in developing the law under our own rule. 5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical basis of the modem procedural device of thirdparty practice is difficult to trace. Professor Moore finds its roots in
the common law device known as "vouching to warranty."6 A grantee
with warranty title who was sued by a third party to recover his land
could vouch his grantor in as a warrantor and request him to defend
the suit. The grantor, however, was not required to join in the suit
nor defend the action. Thus, if the grantee lost the land, another suit
had to be brought against the grantor on the warranty. If the grantee
could prove that a warranty existed between him and the grantor,
that the grantor received notice of the prior suit, and that a judgment
had been obtained against him causing him to lose the land, the
grantor was bound by the outcome of the prior suit.
A theoretical basis for third-party practice is found in the general
principles of equity that allowed for the calling in of all those necessary to the determination of a particular action.7 In addition, the
56th Admiralty Rule,8 which allows additional parties to be brought
in, was formulated on the basis of inherent power of a court to do
substantial justice in regard to an entire matter.9
LAW PRIOR TO RULE 1.41

Prior to the adoption of Rule 1.41, Florida did not specifically
provide for the type of general third-party practice encompassed in
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules. Two separate rules, however, might
have allowed for such a procedure. Rule 1.18 provides in part that
3.

MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1964).

4.
5.

BARRON & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACE AND PROCEDURE (1960).
Cf. Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 173 So. 2d 743, 744 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1965).
6.

MOORE, FEDERAL PRAaricE AND PROCEDURE §14.03 (1) (1964).

7. Note, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 428 (1955).
8. 28 U.S.C. Admiralty Rule 56 (1958) provides: "In any suit, whether in rem
or in personam, the claimant or respondent, (as the case may be) shall be entitled to bring in any other vessel or person . . . who may be partly or wholly
liable either to the libellant or to such claimant or respondent by way of remedy
over, contribution or otherwise, growing out of the same matter." This rule
originally was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in In re New
York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 155 U.S. 523 (1895).
9.

2 BENEDICrT, ADMIRALTY §349 (6th ed. 1940).
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"parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just .... Rule 1.13 (8) provides "when the presence
of parties other than those to the original action is required for the
granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim
or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants .... "
In one respect, then, it would seem that Florida's procedure could
have been broader than the federal practice, which allows a thirdparty claim against one who is not an original party only if he is or
may be liable over to the third-party claimant. Under a liberal interpretation of the above rules, the requirement of the person being
"liable over" found in the federal rules, would not appear to have
been necessary under the Florida Rules.10 On the other hand, Rule
1.13 (8) seems to limit the bringing in of additional parties to the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim. Although it appears
that a liberal construction of the Florida Rules would have allowed
for third-party practice similar to Federal Rule 14, the Florida courts
did not construe the rules to allow such a result.
An analysis of the case law prior to the adoption of Rule 1.41 will
provide an historical background and perspective for understanding
how Rule 1.41 will operate. In Florida Fuel Oil v. Springs Villas,"
the defendant-contractor was sued by Springs Villas for failure to install an air conditioning system according to specifications and in the
alternative for negligent installation and breach of contract of guaranty. Florida Fuel Oil sought to bring in, under Rule 1.13 (8), the architects who drew the plans and specifications for the installation. Florida
Fuel Oil argued that any liability to Springs Villas arose from the
architects' negligence and therefore Rule 1.13 (8) would permit a
claim against the architects so that all the matters could be disposed
of in one suit. The Florida Supreme Court held that Rule 1.13 (8)
could not be employed to bring in the architects under the facts of
the case. Justice Thornal, writing for the court, viewed the claim
asserted against the architects as raising entirely unrelated issues to
the original action and therefore affirmed the dismissal of the crossclaim against the architects. There is an interesting point raised in
the opinion, however, that led some to believe the door was left open
for a third-party practice similar to Rule 14. Justice Thornal wrote:
"This is not a situation where a defendant seeks to bring into the
principal case one who is indemnitor against liability of the defendant
to the original plaintiff."12 This language, read in the context of the
10.

FLORIDA CIVIL PRACIrcE BEFORE TRIAL

11.
12.

95 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 583.

§ 11.7 (1963).
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opinion, would seem to intimate that if the appellant had sought to
bring in an indemnitor under Rule 1.13 (8) it might have been
successful. If such a result had followed, Rule 1.13 (8), although
containing substantially different language, would have operated much
like Rule 14 of the Federal Rules. As later cases arose, however, the
language of Springs Villas was not picked up by the courts and with
respect to Rule 1.13 (8) this would appear justified. The language
of Rule 1.18 (8) is substantially the same as the language of Federal
Rule 13 (h) relating to counterclaims and cross-claims. It is obvious
that the purpose of Federal Rule 13 (h) is different from that of
Rule 14 and since Florida has adopted Federal Rule 13 (h) almost
verbatim, a construction of Rule 1.13 (8) to include a third-party
practice similar to the federal procedure would have been inconsistent.
On the other hand, the liberal construction of Rule 1.18 mentioned
above could have allowed for the implementation of the federal thirdparty practice without a change in the rules. It is interesting to note
that originally some members of the Florida Bar Subcommittee on
Civil Procedure felt that the adoption of Rule 1.41 was unnecessary
because the equitable remedy for multiplicity of suits covered all of
the area that needed to be covered under Rule 1.41.3
Pan American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Construction Co.14 clearly
explains the scope and limits of Rule 1.13 (8). In that case, the appellant sought a reversal of a judgment against it as surety on a performance bond. The appellant was not a party to the original action,
but was brought in pursuant to Rule 1.13 (8). In reversing the trial
court's denial to grant a motion to dismiss, the Third District Court
of Appeal held that to bring in an additional party under Rule
1.13 (8), there must be a cross-claim or counterclaim against existing
parties and the joining of the additional party must be related to
the determination of that claim. Moreover, the joinder must be
necessary to the granting of complete relief. This case would appear
to clear up some of the confusion created by Spring Villas in which it
seemed that under the proper circumstances a party might use Rule
1.13 (8) to join an additional party by filing a cross-claim or counterclaim against them, without such joinder being made pursuant to an
existing cross-claim or counterclaim against an original party to the
suit. The opinion of Judge Carroll in Pan American Surety Co. v.
Jefferson Construction Co.15 makes it clear that the bringing in of
additional parties under Rule 1.13 (8) must be in conjunction with
a counterclaim or cross-claim filed against existing parties.

13. Letter From Henry Trawick to Dennis McGillicuddy, March 24, 1965.
14. 99 So. 2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
15.

Ibid.
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The later case of Crane Co. v. Bradford Builders, Inc.16 illustrates
the limited use of third-party practice within the framework of Rule
1.13 (8) prior to the adoption of Rule 1.41. Appellee, Bradford, was
a general contractor who was faced with the claims of his subcontractors. In seeking exoneration, Bradford deposited a sum of money
with the court and joined the subcontractors and materialmen as
defendants. Crane Company, a subcontractor's materialman, as a
party to the suit, counterclaimed against Bradford and sought to bring
in Bradford's surety as an additional party. The chancellor denied
Crane Company's motion to join the surety and the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed. The court found that because Crane
Company's claim was $800 more than Bradford had allowed for in
his complaint and because there was a possibility that other claims
might exhaust Bradford's deposit, the chancellor should have allowed
Bradford's surety to be brought in so that complete relief might be
granted. Judge Carroll, who wrote for the court in Pan American
Surety, dissented on the ground that it was within the chancellor's
discretion whether it was necessary to bring in an additional party
in order to grant complete relief and that in this case the chancellor
had not abused his discretion because of Rule 3.2, which provides
that a surety who is severally liable is not a necessary party. Whether
Judge Carroll raised a valid point is not of concern in this note;
however, the case as decided by the majority does illustrate the limited
use of third-party practice within the framework of Rule 1.13 (8). It is
at this point in the development of case law under Rule 1.13 (8) that
Florida has adopted Rule 1.41 to allow for a broad third-party practice
as provided under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules.
FLORIDA'S

NEW

THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE RuLE

Rule 1.41 can be termed a "hybrid" third-party practice 1 7 because
the defendant may implead "as of right" until twenty days after
serving his answer to the plaintiff's complaint; thereafter he must
obtain leave to implead. The use of the term "as of right" is somewhat misleading. Although it seems to imply an absolute right to
implead, this is not the case. "As of right" means only that the thirdparty plaintiff can bring in a third-party defendant without applying
to the court for leave to do so. The court must still determine
whether a valid claim exists and whether substantial justice will be
afforded by allowing the impleader.
The advantage of allowing the defendant twenty days to file a
third-party complaint without obtaining leave to do so is that the
16.

17.

116 So. 2d 794 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
See Note, 43 MINN. L. REv. 115 (1958).
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court will not be required to have two hearings on the propriety of
the impleader; but rather, its propriety can be determined in one
hearing with all interested parties raising their objections at that
time. After twenty days the defendant must obtain leave to file a
third-party complaint. A hearing is then held on the motion to obtain
leave to bring in a third-party defendant. If the motion is granted,
a second hearing may often be required to deal with any objections
that the impleaded party might raise. And so, by providing for the
right to implead within twenty days after service of the answer, one
hearing is all that is necessary for ruling on the impleader.
After the right to implead has lapsed, the hearing on the motion
to bring in the third-party defendant is held without the presence
of the party being impleaded. By having a hearing without all the
interested parties present, a danger exists that the court may foreclose the use of Rule 1.41 without having all the pertinent facts
brought out. For this reason, New York, among other states, has provided for impleader as of right unrestricted by a time limitation.18 It
would appear, however, that in most instances twenty days is sufficient
time for the defendant to decide upon the utility of Rule 1.41. This
"hybrid" rule assumes that an impleader not promptly made is of
dubious admissibility and puts the burden on the defendant to justify
a delayed impleader before the action is enlarged.1 9 The disadvantage
of having two hearings on the propriety of the impleader is thus subordinated to the protection afforded to the plaintiff and possible
third-party defendants against undue delay and unmeritorious claims.
Who May Be Brought In?
Rulel.41 (a) allows the defendant to serve a summons and complaint "upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." This allows
the defendant to bring in a third person who may be liable over to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's recovery on the basis of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution, or express or implied warranty. 20 Thus, if a
defendant can state sufficient grounds in his third-party complaint
that, if true, would result in the liability of the third-party to the
defendant for the plaintiff's recovery, impleader may be used. Rule
1.41, as a procedural device, does not enlarge or diminish substantive
rights21 and any attempt to do so would be in conflict with the purpose
and policy of the rule. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the
18.
19.
(pt. 2),
20.
21.

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §1007.
Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963
77 HARv. L. Rav. 801 (1964).
IA BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §426 (1960).
D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958).
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substantive law of Florida out of which a third-party claim may arise.
A brief look into the Florida law in the areas in which impleader may
arise will serve as basis for understanding the proper use of thirdparty practice.
Indemnity. Perhaps the most common situation in which thirdparty practice may arise is when A sues B, and B has contracted with
C for indemnification against the liability that A is asserting against
B. B can serve a third-party complaint on C based upon their express
agreement. Florida defines a contract of indemnity as an original
undertaking by which the promisor, C, agrees to protect the promisee,
22
B, against loss or damage by reason of liability to a third person, A.
A familiar example of an indemnity contract is the automobile liability insurance policy. Indemnity may arise also from an implied contract, as illustrated by the right of a trustee to reimbursement for ex23
penditures made in behalf of an estate.
Suretyship. Suretyship can be distinguished from indemnity in that
indemnity protects against loss resulting from liability to a third person whereas suretyship protects the promisee against loss caused by
the failure of a third person to carry out his obligations to the
promisee.

24

The case of Ruckman & Hansen, Inc. v. Contracting & Material

Co., 25 in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, illustrates one way in

which a suretyship arrangement can form the basis of a third-party
complaint. Ruckman Sc Hansen, Inc. entered into a prime contract
with the State of Indiana for construction of two highway overpasses.
The excavation for the project was subcontracted to Contracting &
Material Co. who assigned the subcontract to National Asphalt Paving
Co. The Home Indemnity Co. executed a surety bond with Contracting Sc Material Co. on the performance by National Asphalt. When
the assignee, National Asphalt, defaulted on the subcontract, Ruckman Sc Hansen, Inc. brought suit against Contracting &cMaterial Co.,
who successfully brought in Home Indemnity on the surety bond.
Although the case was concerned particularly with whether the surety
was discharged to the extent of progress payments made by Contracting
S Material Co. to the defaulting assignee, the factual pattern points
up the common situation in which a suretyship arrangement will
operate under Rule 1.41.

22. E.g., Royal Indemnity Co. v. Knott, 101 Fla. 1495, 136 So. 474 (1931).
23.

17

FLA. JUR.

Indemnity §6 (1958).

24. 30 FLA. JUR. Suretyship and Guaranty §4 (1960).
25. 328 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1964).
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In Pan American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Construction Co.,26 previously discussed,27 a surety on a subcontractor's performance bond was
brought in by one of the original defendants. Although the decision
does not indicate who brought the surety in, it undoubtedly was the
general contractor. The Third District Court of Appeal held that
the surety was improperly brought in because the requirements of
Rule 1.13 (8), which allowed for the joining of additional parties
pursuant to a counterclaim or cross-claim, were not met. The court
pointed out, however, that if Florida had an equivalent to Rule 14
of the Federal Rules, the surety could have been brought in. Thus,
if a similar case arose under Rule 1.41, the surety could be successfully impleaded.
Contribution. Contribution is an obligation imposed by law based
on the theory that parties, standing equal before the law, should
contribute equally to the discharge of a common liability.28 Section
45.04 of the Florida Statutes provides for contribution in favor of
cosurities on bonds, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange.29 A joint
owner of property who pays more than one-half of a debt owing on
30
the property is entitled to contribution from the other joint owner.
In the situations described above, Rule 1.41 provides a means for
bringing in a co-obligor and thereby making it possible to avoid a
second suit.
In Florida, a joint tortfeasor does not have the right to contribution.3 1 There is, however, a recognized exception to this general
rule that allows for contribution when the tortfeasors are not in pari
delicto. Thus, in Seaboard Air Line Railway v. American District
Electric Protective Co.,3 2 an employer who had been held liable to his
employee for injuries received from defective wires in an alarm system
was allowed contribution from the company that installed the system.
The court recognized that although both the employer and the installer were wrongdoers, they did not stand in the same relationship to
the injured employee. The installer, being guilty of active negligence,
was the primary cause of the injury, whereas the employer was
guilty of passive or constructive negligence based on the masterservant relationship. The court pointed out that the employer's right
26.
27.
28.

99 So. 2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
See discussion in text at note 14.
Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1955); 7 FLA.

JUR.

Contribution §2

(1956).
29. See Freed v. Giuliani, 164 So. 2d 234 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
30. Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1955).
31. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932).
32. 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932).
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to recover against the installer arose out of the contract to install
and maintain the system. Although the court held that this set of
facts raises an exception to the general rule of no contribution among
joint tortfeasors, it appears that the actual basis of the decision lies in
an implied contract of indemnity. In similar situations, when a court
distinguishes differing types of negligence on the basis of active and
passive and declares the joint tortfeasors not to be in pari delicto, the
indemnity concept seems to override the traditional concepts of contribution. 33 Full recovery by the employer in Seaboard for his liability
to employee is further evidence that such is the case. Had Rule 1.41
been in effect, the employer could have properly impleaded the installer in the original action by the employee, thus avoiding the subsequent suit to determine his right to "contribution."
Subrogation. Subrogation can be defined as the substitution of
one party in place of another with reference to a lawful claim or
right originally held by the latter, which moves to the former because
of some express or implied agreement or by operation of law.34 The
use of impleader in a common situation where subrogation arises is
35
illustrated by Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Building Corp.
Glens Falls was sued by their insured to recover payment of a settlement made by them arising out of an assault and battery by the president of the insured company. Glens Falls had refused to join in the
original suit against their insured, having denied liability under the
policy.3 6 Glens Falls impleaded the president of the insured company
on the theory that the damage suffered by the insured was caused by
the president, and therefore he could be held liable to the insured for
such damage. Because the policy provided for the subrogation of the
insurer to the rights of the insured to recover in the event of payment
by the insured, Glens Falls had a claim upon the president if their
insured recovered against them. Thus, Glens Falls successfully impleaded the president under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules.
Warranty. Liability for breach of warranty is based upon the
right of the purchaser to expect a saleable article answering the
33. Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. FtA. L. Rav. 175, 193 (1958).
34. Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 So. 644 (1916). Florida recognizes two
types of subrogation. "Legal" subrogation arises by operation of law when one
party, having a liability, or a right, pays the debt of another and thereby is entitled to the security or obligation held by the one he has paid. North v. Albee,
155 Fla. 515, 20 So. 2d 682 (1945). "Conventional" subrogation arises when one
party, having no real interest, pays the debt of another under an express or implied agreement. Lovingood v. Butler Constr. Co., 100 Fla. 1252, 131 So. 126 (1930).
35. 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1962).
36. Glens Falls could have been impleaded by their insured in the original suit,
subject, of course, to the court's discretion.
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description in the contract. 37 Although liability for breach of warranty in the area of products liability is undergoing rapid development, 38 a simple fact situation is illustrative of the use of third-party
practice based upon warranty. A, a manufacturer, purchases component parts from B. C, who has been injured by the use of the
article produced by A, brings suit against A. A, claiming that the
injury to C was caused by a defect in the parts supplied by B, could
39
seek to implead B on the theory of warranty.
Recognizing that Rule 1.41 does not affect substantive rights, a
question is raised whether impleader is proper where a substantive
right to recovery against a third party is contingent upon liability
being established against the party seeking recovery from the third
person. In view of the underlying policy of the rule and the explicit
language allowing impleader of a person "who is or may be liable,"
the question must be answered affirmatively. The federal courts in
interpreting Rule 14 have consistently allowed for this acceleration
of liability40 Acceleration means that the liability of the party seeking
the impleader does not have to be established. It is sufficient that if
liability is established a claim exists against the third-party defendant.
Since many insurance policies indemnify only against "loss," refusal
to allow for the third-party defendant's liability to be accelerated
would rob the rule of its procedural advantage. 41 Therefore, although
a judgment may be obtained on a third-party claim, execution on that
judgment should be disallowed until the third-party plaintiff had
discharged the judgment against him when the indemnity contract
protects against loss only.4 2 Also, even though Florida law requires
3
that liability be fixed by judgment in the case of contribution,4
acceleration of liability should not be precluded, since substantive
rights are not affected.
PURPOSE

The purpose of third-party practice is to prevent circuity of action
by allowing parties who may be ultimately liable to join in a single
action in order that the claims arising out of the subject matter of the
37. See Posey v. Ford Motor Co., 128 So. 2d 149 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
38. See Note, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 421 (1964) for a discussion of products liability
in Florida.
39. See, e.g., Delta Tank Mfg. Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 150 F. Supp. 525 (N.D.
Ohio 1957).
40. E.g., Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1952); Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942).
41. D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958).
42. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE §14.03 (7) (1964).
43. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
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suit may be determined in one proceeding. 44 When used with propriety, third-party practice precludes the necessity of trying several
related claims in separate law suits, thereby enhancing the administration of justice and expediting the settlement of disputes between
parties.
Third-party practice allows for the facilitation of several desirable
results. One is to eliminate the time lag between a judgment against
a defendant and a subsequent judgment for the defendant against
a third party who is liable to him for the amount recovered by the
plaintiff. Prior to the adoption of impleader in Florida, only under
limited circumstances could a party who had attempted to protect
himself from ultimate liability for money damages through an indemnity contract have his rights under that contract adjudicated in
the suit that determined his liability to the plaintiff. 45 The defendant, after a judgment had been entered against him, had to initiate
a subsequent suit against his alleged indemnitor with a resulting time
lag that may have handicapped him. Impleader obviates this handicap. The elimination of separate law suits through impleader also
guarantees consistent results flowing out of the same basic set of facts.46
The cost of duplicating evidence and inconvenience to witnesses by
requiring testimony at an additional trial is also avoided.
PROPRIETY OF THE IMPLEADER

The propriety of the impleader should be determined on the
basis of two considerations: (1) does the third-party complaint state
a claim upon which relief can be granted7 and (2) will the interests
of justice, economy, and expedition be served with due regard to the
48
parties involved.
Legal Sufficiency of the Third-Party Claim
The third-party complaint must set forth a basis for liability of
the third-party defendant over to the third-party plaintiff for the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant. 49 Rule 1.41, however, should
not require that the third-party complaint be based on the same
theory as the plaintiff's complaint,50 but only that the claim arise out

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

American Export Lines v. Revel, 262 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1958).
See discussion in text following note 10.
1A BARRON & HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE §422 (1960).
McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960).
Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960).
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956).
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of the same occurrence or transaction that makes up the aggregate of
operative facts upon which the plaintiff's claim is founded.51 In determining the legal sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the ultimate facts alleged should be taken as true52 and a motion to dismiss
or vacate the third-party complaint should be granted only if it appears that the third-party plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any set of facts that could be proved in behalf of his claim.53
A third-party complaint cannot be based on direct liability to the
plaintiff.54 To allow such a complaint to stand would pervert thirdparty practice into an instrumentality for thrusting onto the plaintiff
additional parties from whom he may be unwilling and reluctant to
recover. 55 The federal courts, however, have held that when the thirdparty complaint alleges direct liability to the plaintiff as well as
liability over to the defendant, the allegations of direct liability will
not be fatal to the complaint but will be disregarded as surplusage.56
When it appears that direct liability of the third-party defendant to
the plaintiff is a possibility, the rule provides that the plaintiff may
assert any claim against the third-party defendant that arises out of
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
suit. This language is permissive in order that the plaintiff may assert a claim if he so desires. To require the plaintiff to assert what
might be a germane claim against the impleaded party could thwart
the policy of the rule by requiring the plaintiff to litigate against a
party whom he originally may have decided not to sue.
Discretionof the Court
The court may dismiss the complaint even though the third-party
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.57 Such
a ruling should be overturned only if there has been an abuse of
discretion. 55 The propriety of the impleader is to be considered with
due regard to the setting in which it arises, taking into account the
timeliness of the impleader with respect to the service of the defendant's answer, and the time set for trial, so as to allow sufficient
time for preparation by the third-party defendant. 59 The court should
51. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
52. *See Ocala Loan Co. v. Smith, 155 So. 2d 711 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
53. Rodeheaver v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 220 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
54. Wolfe v. Johnson, 21 F.R.D. 280 (N.D. W. Va. 1958).
55. Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb. 1950).
56. Keller Crescent Printing & Engraving Co. v. Rosen, 135 F. Supp. 22 (W.D.
Pa. 1955).
57. E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Irvin, 274 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1960).
58. Wetherbee v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951).
59. General Elec. Co. v. Irvin, 274 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1960).
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also consider the extent to which the evidence required to prove
both claims are the same and whether common issues are so closely
intertwined that consistent results may depend on their being decided
at one time.60 If impleader will complicate the issues so as to confuse
the jury, the third-party complaint may be struck, severed, or separated for trial, 61 although the fact that the issues are more complicated
than usual will not by itself justify a denial of impleader.6 2 The court
should also take into account the risk of prejudice if a party, such
as an insurance company, is impleaded.6 3 In exercising its discretion,
the court ought to apply a balancing test weighing the policy of the
rule as against possible prejudice to the parties involved in terms of
time, expense, or substantive prejudice.
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

Once the third-party defendant has been brought in, a question
is raised as to the extent of the impleaded party's rights and liabilities
with respect to the other parties to the action. The import of Rule
1.41 is that once the third party is impleaded he becomes a party to
the action for most purposes. He may make his defenses to the thirdparty complaint and move to have the complaint struck.6 4 He may
assert the defenses available to the third-party plaintiff against the
original plaintiff, although he is not required to do so.65 He may
counterclaim against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claim against
other third-party defendants.6 6 He may also assert a claim against the
plaintiff, provided it arises out of the operative set of facts upon which
the plaintiff's original complaint is based; 67 and likewise the plaintiff
may assert a claim against him. 68 The third-party defendant may
also use Rule 1.41 to bring in a person who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of a claim made against him in the action.69
60. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1956).
61. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.41 (a).
62. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
63. Compare American Zinc Co. of Ill. v. H. H. Hall Constr. Co., 21 F.R.D.
190 (E.D. Ill. 1957), with Rosalis v. Universal Distribs., Inc., 21 F.R.D. 169 (D.
Conn. 1957). See DeParcq & Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under
Modern Pleading Rules, 38 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1954) for a general discussion
on impleading insurance companies.
64. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8, 1.11.
65. Wiggins v. City of Philadelphia, 216 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
66.

See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13.

67.

FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.41.

68.

Ibid.

69. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.41 (b) allows a plaintiff to utilize impleader in a
counterclaim asserted against him.
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What is the extent of the impleaded party's liability to the thirdparty plaintiff beyond his liability for the plaintiff's claim? In Noland
Co. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.,70 a third-party complaint
was filed against a supplier of the defendant subcontractor for his
liability to the general contractor. The subcontractor sought to recover damages for loss of profits because of the supplier's default, in
addition to recovery for his liability to the general contractor. The
third-party defendant objected to this additional claim on the ground
that Rule 14, by its language, limited liability to the extent of the
defendant's liability to the plaintiff. The court, however, did not
construe Rule 14 so narrowly. The additional claim was allowed because the parties had conceded that this claim was not complicated
and the facts supporting the subcontractor's ancillary claim were
substantially the same as those in the primary action. The result in
this case can be justified on the basis of the policy of the rule. Since
pretrial procedures can be used to foresee possible complications, allowing similar ancillary claims should be determined on the basis of
the court's discretion whether the interests of justice are to be
served in the particular case at hand.
JURIsDICrIoN AND VEuE

The jurisdictional grounds for the third-party claim may be
derived from the jurisdictional basis of the original claim. 1 Allowing
ancillary jurisdiction as the basis for Rule 1.41 does not appear to
contravene previous Florida law, 72 and to require independent grounds
of jurisdiction would emasculate third-party practice. Likewise, venue
should not be an obstacle to impleader. Sections 46.01, .02, .03, and
.04 of the Florida Statutes determine the venue of the original action,
and as long as these requirements are met the third-party defendant
should not be heard to object on the basis of venue.7 3 If substantial
inconvenience inures to the third-party defendant, he may ask the
court to exercise its discretion and dismiss the complaint against him.If the plaintiff asserts a claim against the third-party defendant, or
if the third-party defendant asserts a claim against the plaintiff as
permitted by Rule 1.41, the jurisdiction of the court should not be
effected unless the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
limits of the court.7 5 Of course, if such a claim is asserted and there
is jurisdictional basis for the claim, the right of a party to counter70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962). (See change in text.)
Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
See FLOREDA CIVIL PRACiCE BEFORE TRIAL §11.8 (1963).
Accord, United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954).
Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959).

75.

Cf. FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFoRE TRIAL §6K25
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claim is governed by Rule 1.13. Also, no problem of venue should
be raised with respect to these claims.76 Venue is directed toward
facilitating the convenience of the parties while requiring the forum
to be related to the action. Since such a claim must arise out of the
same occurrence or transaction that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's original claim, sufficient protection is afforded to see that the
forum is reasonably related to the additional claim.
CONCLUSION

Third-party practice can be of great service to the administration
of justice. The facility of this procedural device should cut down the
ultimate cost of litigation, provide for the speedier determination of
legal rights, and relieve, to some extent, the problem of crowded
dockets.
A superficial examination of Rule 1.41 might lead to a conclusion
that it is a tool for the defendant and so it should be construed
liberally in favor of the defendant. The statement is true as far as
it goes, but it does not present the whole picture. The plaintiff's
interests must be protected so that his substantive rights are not
affected and he is not required to litigate with a party he originally
determined not to bring in the suit. The interests of the third-party
defendant must also be protected to prevent Rule 1.41 from being
used as a means of harassment.
The adoption of Rule 1.41 is a significant advancement in the
procedural law of Florida; however, its success or failure will depend
upon a proper utilization by the attorney and the "sense of justice"
of the judge who determines the propriety of the impleader.
DENNIS

76.

J.

McGILLICUDDY

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §14.03 (21) (1964).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

15

